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Abstract
We examine the effects of reorganizing electricity markets on ca-
pacity investments, retail prices and welfare when demand is uncer-
tain. We study the following market configurations: (i) integrated
monopoly, (ii) integrated duopoly with wholesale trade, and (iii) sep-
arated duopoly with wholesale trade. Assuming that wholesale prices
can react to changes in retail prices (but not vice versa), we find that
generators install sufficient capacity to serve retail demand in each
market configuration, thus avoiding black-outs. Furthermore, aggre-
gate capacity levels and retail prices are such that the separated (inte-
grated) duopoly with wholesale trade performs best (worst) in terms
of welfare.
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1 Introduction
Electricity markets around the world have recently been reformed to im-
prove their economic performance. In many countries, legislators have al-
lowed competition into statutory, vertically integrated monopolies and im-
plemented regulations such as vertical unbundling or even full vertical sep-
aration to prevent harmful strategic behavior.1 Yet, the reform process is
far from complete, and there is no consensus that a single model is best
(Pittman, 2003). In particular, there is a concern that deregulation—i.e., in-
troducing imperfect competition into statutory monopolies—may undermine
infrastructure investments (see, e.g., Buehler et al. (2004)) and even cause
adverse welfare effects. Although there are some studies which investigate
into the incentives to install capacities in (more) competitive electricity mar-
kets (see, e.g., von der Fehr and Harbord (1997), Castro-Rodriguez et al.
(2001), Boom (2002) and (2003) as well as Borenstein and Holland (2005)),
there is, at least to our knowledge, no formal analysis of the interplay of the
vertical structure and the introduction of competition on capacity investment
in generation and on electricity prices, and how they affect welfare.
The present paper provides an analytical framework for studying the effects of
restructuring electricity. More specifically, we study different configurations
of an electricity market model that vary with respect to (a) the vertical
structure and (b) the extent to which firms compete. In this model, retail
demand is linear and stochastic, and retail prices are set before wholesale
prices are determined in a unit price auction according to von der Fehr and
Harbord (1997) and (1993). This implies, in particular, that wholesale prices
can react to changes in retail prices, whereas retail prices cannot reflect
changes in wholesale prices. We also require that electricity generators decide
on their capacity levels before retail prices are known.
To analyze the effects of restructuring, we compare the equilibrium outcomes
under (i) integrated monopoly, (ii) integrated duopoly with wholesale trade,
and (iii) separated duopoly with wholesale trade. The vertical structure as
well as the market structure in generation and retail is exogenous for the
1In the UK, for example, the industry was vertically separated in three generating firms,
in the National Grid company and in 12 regional distribution companies by the Electricity
Act in 1989. Some regional distribution companies, however, vertically integrated into
generation later on (Newbery, 1999, 2005). The Californian restructuring bill from 1996
also forced the regulated utilities to sell lots of their generation facilities (Borenstein, 2002).
The European Union ruled in its Directive 2003/54/EC concerning common rules for the
internal market in electricity adopted on 26 June 2003 that electricity generating firms
which are also integrated into the transmission and distribution of electricity have to be
functionally disintegrated.
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different scenarios.
Our main results are the following. First, capacity investments are highest
under integrated duopoly and lowest under integrated monopoly. Second, re-
tail prices are lowest under separated duopoly and highest under integrated
duopoly. Third, the combined investment and price effects of restructuring
are such that the separated duopoly yields the highest social welfare, whereas
the integrated duopoly yields the lowest social welfare. Together, our findings
suggest that restructuring electricity is likely to increase both capacity in-
vestments and welfare, if it implements (imperfect) competition and vertical
separation.
The intuition for this result is as follows. Introducing competition requires
firms to make strategic investment and pricing decisions. Under integrated
duopoly, strategic investment and pricing decisions yield high investments
and retail prices, as firms face the risk of being unable to serve own retail
demand and, consequently, being exploited by their competitor during the
wholesale auction. Vertical separation eliminates both the risk of excessive
retail demand and the direct influence of generators on retail prices. As
a result, both capacities and retail prices are lower than under integrated
duopoly. Yet, as total capacity is always sufficient to serve retail demand
at the relevant retail price, irrespective of market configuration, the reduced
investment does not pose a problem from a social welfare point of view.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we in-
troduce our analytical framework. In Section 3, we derive the capacity in-
vestment and retail price that maximize the expected profit of an integrated
monopolist. In Sections 4 and 5 we derive the equilibrium under separated
and integrated duopoly, respectively. Section 6 compares the equilibrium
outcomes and provides a detailed discussion of the intuition for our results.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Analytical Framework
In this section, we outline the analytical framework for the various market
configurations considered below. We first consider the demand side. Suppose
that the retail customers’ surplus function is given by
V (x; ε, r) = U(x, ε)− rx = x− ε− (x− ε)
2
2
− rx, (1)
where x is the consumed electricity, r is the retail market price paid per
unit of electricity, and ε is a demand shock, uniformly distributed on the
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interval [0, 1]. Maximizing V (x; ε, r) with respect to x yields the following
retail demand for electricity
x(r, ε) = max{1 + ε− r, 0}. (2)
If there is more than one retailer, retail customers subscribe to the retailer
offering the lowest retail price, as electricity is a homogeneous good. If the
prices offered by the retailers are identical, consumers choose each retailer
with equal probability.
As to the supply side, we consider three different market configuration that
differ in terms of the number of active firms and the industry’s vertical struc-
ture (see Table 1): (i) integrated monopoly, (ii) integrated duopoly with
wholesale trade (2 integrated firms), and (iii) separated duopoly with whole-
sale trade (2× 2 firms).2
Table 1: Alternative Market Configurations
Integration Separation
No Competition integrated monopoly –
Competition integrated duopoly separated duopoly
For simplicity, we assume that the marginal cost of generating electricity
is constant and normalized to zero. The total costs of electricity generator
i = A,B are thus given by
C(ki) = zki, (3)
where z is the constant unit cost of capacity and ki the generating capacity
installed by firm i.3
In the two duopoly models we impose the following timing of the game mo-
tivated by the real world:
• In stage 1, electricity generators i = A,B decide on their capacity ki
before the level of retail demand is known. In the integrated duopoly
we assume that capacity decisions are taken simultaneously. In the
separated duopoly we additionally analyze sequential investment de-
cisions and consider the case where generator A gets to decide before
generator B.
2We abstract from the so-called chain of monopolies for reasons that will become clear
below.
3Firm indices may be ignored when there is only one generator.
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• In stage 2 retailers ℓ = C,D simultaneously offer linear retail prices
rℓ in the separated duopoly whereas the two integrated generators
i = A,B simultaneously offer linear retail prices ri in the integrated
duopoly. Consumers buy from the firm with the lower retail price, or,
if prices are identical, from each firm with probability one half.
• In stage 3, the demand shock ε ∈ [0, 1] is realized.
• In stage 4, generators A and B submit price bids pA and pB for their
full capacity ki, i = A,B to an auctioneer. The auctioneer then deter-
mines the market clearing wholesale price p (whenever possible) and
the amount of electricity each generator may supply to the grid.4
• Finally, in stage 5, if supply and demand cannot be balanced, a black-
out occurs, and agents do not exchange deliveries and payments. If
demand and supply can be equated, retail customers are served and
both retailers and generators receive their respective payments.
We model the timing of the benchmark case of an integrated monopoly as
close as possible to these duopoly scenarios. Therefore the monopoly firm
chooses its capacity and its retail price before the uncertainty concerning the
demand level has been resolved.
It is crucial to note that the retail price in the two duopoly settings is de-
termined before the wholesale price. This is in marked contrast to the stan-
dard literature on vertically related industries, where the timing is typically
reversed, i.e. the wholesale price is determined before the retail price(see
Section 6.2 for further details). The difference is motivated by the special
characteristics of the electric power industry, where retailers typically spec-
ify the terms of delivering electricity before demand is known and then buy
electricity on behalf of their customers on the wholesale market. That is,
the retail market clears in the long run, whereas the wholesale market clears
in the short run. This implies, in particular, that the wholesale price is a
function of the retail price, whereas the retail price cannot react to changes
in the wholesale price. Therefore, the chain of monopolies is not a sensible
structure: The upstream monopolist would always be able to fully extract
the downstream monopolist’s profit by setting the wholesale price equal to
the retail price determined in the previous stage.5 The retail monopolist
4In the integrated monopoly, the wholesale price is irrelevant for the outcome, as it
solely allocates profits to upstream and downstream facilities.
5This particular form of a price squeeze is possible as retailers must commit to a retail
price before the wholesale price is determined.
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would thus be indifferent between all admissible retail prices, leaving the
equilibrium outcome indeterminate.
Despite of our special timing, the determination of the wholesale price re-
mains crucial for the outcome in the various market configurations, as it
affects the returns on investment for an electricity generator. For the sake
of concreteness, we assume that the wholesale price is determined according
to a unit price auction introduced by von der Fehr and Harbord (1997) and
(1993).6 Unit price auctions were used for the Electricity Pool in England
and Wales before the reform in 2001, and are still in use elsewhere, e.g. for
the Nord Pool in Scandinavia, or the Spanish wholesale market.7
This unit price auction requires each firm i to bid a price pi at which it is
willing to supply its total capacity.8 The auctioneer will then attempt to
balance supply and demand on the grid.9 To do so, he arranges the bids in
ascending order and determines the marginal bid that is just necessary to
equate supply and demand. The price of the marginal bid is the spot mar-
ket price that is payed to all generators for each unit that is dispatched on
the grid (irrespective of the bids made by these generators).10 The capacity
of suppliers bidding below the spot market price is dispatched completely,
whereas the marginal supplier is allowed to deliver just the amount of elec-
tricity necessary to balance supply and demand. If the supplied capacity at
a certain bid price is insufficient to satisfy demand, but would be more than
sufficient to satisfy demand at the next higher bid price, the auctioneer sets
the spot market price in between the two bid prices so as to balance supply
and demand.11
Note that in our framework, the auctioneer may be unable to find a wholesale
price that equates supply and demand, since neither retail demand nor gen-
eration capacity can respond to changes in the wholesale price. Therefore,
6An alternative approach, based on Klemperer and Meyer (1989), has been suggested
by Green and Newbery (1992). They assume that firms bid differentiable supply functions,
whereas von der Fehr and Harbord (1997) and (1993) assume that they bid step functions.
7See Bergman et al. (1999), Crampes and Fabra (2005) and Newbery (2005).
8That is, we abstract from the problem of strategic capacity withholding (see Crampes
and Creti (2001), and Le Coq (2002).
9For simplicity, we ignore transmission constraints, although they might interact with
constraints in the generating capacity. See Wilson (2002) for insights into this problem
and for the analysis of isolated transmission constraints Borenstein et al. (2000), Joskow
and Tirole (2000) and Léautier (2001)
10Note the difference to Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), where the undercutting firm
receives its own price per unit sold even if its capacity is too low to serve the market, so
that some customers have to pay the price of the competitor with the next higher price.
11In line with Wilson (2002) we consider an integrated system because participation in
the auction is compulsory if a generating firm wants to sell electricity.
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a black-out may occur, where demand cannot be served, and firms receive
no payments. Since in our framework demand does not respond to changes
in the wholesale price and since the total amount of installed capacities can
not be influenced by the wholesale price, the auctioneer may also fail to find
a price that balances supply and demand in the market. Then a black-out
occurs. No firm can sell and deliver electricity, and all the firms realise zero
profits. Thus, we abstract from any sort of rationing by the auctioneer or the
retailers of electricity.12 This assumption maximizes the punishment for the
generators if their aggregate capacity is too small, thus also maximizing the
incentive to install capacity. For the sake of simplicity we also abstract from
the fact that in reality firms compete repeatedly on the wholesale and on
the retail market.13 As retailers face no other costs than those from buying
electricity on behalf of their customers in the separated duopoly case, they
are active if and only if the wholesale price is not larger than the relevant
retail price (p ≤ r). For p > r, the retailers must declare bankruptcy and
exit the market, so that generators cannot sell electricity either.
We now proceed to the analysis of the equilibrium outcomes in the various
market configurations. We begin with the benchmark case of Integrated
Monopoly.
3 Integrated Monopoly
Consider the pricing and investment decisions taken by a vertically inte-
grated monopolist. Recall that, in this case, there is no wholesale market for
electricity. The monopolist thus simply chooses the retail price rm and the
capacity level km that maximize expected profits
π(r, k) =


∫ 1
max{r−1,0} r(1 + ε− r)dε− zk, if r ≥ 2− k,∫ k−1+r
max{r−1,0} r(1 + ε− r)dε− zk, if max{0, 1− k} ≤ r < 2− k,
−zk, if r < max{0, 1− k}.
The first element of π(r, k) is relevant when the retail price r is so large that
demand is always smaller than capacity, even for the highest possible demand
12See Joskow and Tirole (2004) for an analysis of a market where retailers propose not
only prices to consumers but also rationing rules which they want to apply. Although
in reality domestic consumers are sometimes rationed, the rationing rules are usually not
spelled out in any sort of contract with their retailers.
13Therefore collusion which has been analysed by Fabra (2003) and by Dechenaux and
Kovenock (2005) for the wholesale market is out of the scope of this analysis.
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shock ε = 1.14 The second element is relevant when r is in an intermediate
range, such that demand is smaller than capacity for the lowest possible
demand shock ε = 0 and larger than capacity for the highest possible demand
shock ε = 1.15 Finally, the third element is relevant if the retail price is low
enough that demand is always larger than capacity (even for the smallest
possible demand shock ε = 0).
Our first result gives the retail price and capacity (rm, km) that maximize
the expected profit of an integrated monopolist.
Proposition 1 (integrated monopoly) For capacity costs z ≤ 1/2, the
profit maximizing choices (rm, km) are given by
rm =
3
4
+
z
2
; km =
5
4
− z
2
. (4)
For capacity costs z > 1/2, the integrated monopoly is not sustainable, as
π(rm, km) < 0.
Proof: Boom (2003).
Intuitively, Proposition 1 states that if capacity costs are not too high, the
monopolist will earn non-negative profits and choose both the retail price and
its capacity so as to avoid a black-out (in which case the monopolist would
realize a negative profit due to sunk capacity costs). In this case, the retail
price increases in the cost of capacity, whereas the installed capacity decreases
in the cost of capacity. If capacity costs are too high, even optimal choices
of (rm, km) do not yield non-negative profits, and the integrated monopoly
is thus not a sustainable market configuration.
Next, we consider the separated duopoly with competition both at the up-
stream and downstream level of the industry.
4 Separated Duopoly (2×2 Firms)
Consider a market configuration with two independent firms competing in
electricity generation and two independent firms which compete on the retail
market for electricity. As usual, we use backwards induction to derive the
14In this case, the condition k ≥ (1 + ε− r) becomes equal to r ≥ 2− k. Furthermore,
the lower bound of the integral assures a positive demand.
15The former requires r ≥ max{0, 1 − k}, and the latter r < 2 − k. The upper bound
of the integral assures that a black-out does not occur, i.e. capacity is sufficient to satisfy
demand.
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subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game. Given the timing described
in Section 2, we therefore start with the wholesale market. Next, we study
the retail market. Finally, we analyze the investment decisions of electricity
generators.
4.1 Wholesale Market
If the generators’ combined capacities are sufficient to satisfy retail demand
at the equilibrium retail price in the separated duopoly, r∗, i.e. kA + kB ≥
x(r∗, ε), the wholesale price determined in the unit price auction is given by
p(pA, pB) = pi
{
if pi < pj and ki ≥ x(r∗, ε) or
if pi ≥ pj and kj < x(r∗, ε) ≤ kA + kB, (5)
with i, j = A,B and i 6= j. If the combined capacity is insufficient to satisfy
demand, kA+kB < x(r
∗, ε), the auctioneer cannot find a wholesale price that
equates supply and demand, and a black-out occurs.
The volume of electricity yi that generator i = A,B can sell is also a function
of the price bids pA and pB. It is given by
yi(pA, pB) =


min{ki, x(r∗, ε)} if pi < pj,
min{ki,x(r∗,ε)}
2
+
max{0,x(r∗,ε)−kj}
2
if pi = pj,
max{0, x(r∗, ε)− kj} if pi > pj,
(6)
with i, j = A,B and i 6= j. Thus, using (5) and (6), the profit of generator
i = A,B at this stage of the game is
πi(pA, pB) = p(pA, pB)yi(pA, pB).
Since the firms’ bidding behavior in our setting is equivalent to that derived
by Crampes and Creti (2001) and Le Coq (2002) for given capacity levels, we
omit the details here. Intuitively, best response price bidding requires each
firm to either undercut the rival or bid the maximum price pi = r
∗ at which
the retailers are just indifferent between participating in the market or exiting
it. In the latter case there would be no demand in the wholesale market
and the generators could not sell their electricity. Our next proposition
characterizes the resulting Nash equilibria in price bids.
Proposition 2 (wholesale prices) Depending on the capacity levels (kA, kB)
and the retail price r∗, there are the following types of Nash equilibria in price
bids:
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(i) If kA + kB < x(r
∗, ε), any pair (pA, pB) forms a Nash equilibrium in
price bids. No wholesale price can equate supply and demand, and a
black-out occurs.
(ii) If ki ≥ x(r∗, ε) > kj, with i, j = A,B and i 6= j, the Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies is characterised by pi = r
∗ and pj < r∗(x(r∗, ε)−kj)/ki.
The resulting equilibrium wholesale price is p∗ = r∗, and firms sell the
quantities yi = x(r
∗, ε)− kj and yj = kj.
(iii) If kA + kB ≥ x(r∗, ε) > max{kA, kB}, there are two types of Nash
equilibria in pure strategies: one with pA = r
∗ and pB < r∗(x(r∗, ε) −
kB)/kA, and another with pB = r
∗ and pA < r∗(x(r∗, ε)− kA)/kB. The
wholesale price is the same (p∗ = r∗) for both types of equilibria, but the
quantities sold in equilibrium differ: in the former yA = x(r
∗, ε) − kB
and yB = kB, whereas in the latter yA = kA and yB = x(r
∗, ε)− kA.
(iv) If min{kA, kB} ≥ x(r∗, ε) the Nash equilibrium pA = pB = 0 is unique.
The resulting equilibrium wholesale price is p∗ = 0, and firms sell the
quantities yA = yB = x(r
∗, ε)/2.
Proof: See appendix A of Le Coq (2002) or the proofs of proposition 1-
3 in Crampes and Creti (2001), using that the constant marginal cost of
generating electricity is identical and equal to zero by assumption, whereas
the maximum price with positive demand is p = r∗.
Proposition 1 is illustrated in Figure 1. AreaA coincides with case (i), where
demand exceeds aggregate installed capacity and a black-out must therefore
occur. Areas B and D are associated with case (ii): In area B, firm A is the
large firm, whereas firm B is the small firm; in D, these roles are reversed.
In both cases, the large firm bids the maximum price r∗, whereas the small
firm bids just low enough to avoid undercutting by the large firm. In area C,
which corresponds to case (iii), the difference in installed capacities is smaller
than in either B or D, and two types of equilibria are possible: Either the
large or the small firm bids the maximum price, and the other firm bids
low enough to avoid undercutting. In both cases the equilibrium wholesale
price is p∗ = r∗. Finally, area E corresponds to case (iv). Here, each firm
has sufficient capacity to satisfy demand alone. Therefore, the price bidding
yields a unique Bertrand type equilibrium where p∗ = 0.
Clearly, multiple Nash equilibria in pure strategies exist for the cases (i)–
(iii), as any lower bid that avoids both undercutting and negative profits is
admissible. Yet, for cases (i) and (ii), all Nash equilibria in pure strategies
are pay-off equivalent. For case (iii), however, the different types of equilibria
9
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Figure 1: Prices on the Wholesale Market
are not pay-off equivalent, as the volume of dispatched electricity yi(pA, pB)
depends on the type of equilibrium played. For these capacities we assume
the following:16
Assumption 1 If the generating capacities satisfy kA + kB ≥ x(r∗, ε) >
max{kA, kB}, generators are assumed to co-ordinate on a Nash equilibrium
where the firm with the larger capacity bids the maximum price and the firm
with the smaller capacity bids low enough to avoid undercutting by the large
firm. If generators have equal capacities, they play each type of equilibria
with equal probability.
4.2 Retail Market
Retailers compete à la Bertrand. Therefore a retailer cannot realize a positive
profit if its price is higher than its competitor’s price. In addition the demand
shock must be, on the one hand, large enough to generate a positive demand
16There are indications that with asymmetric capacities this assumption is equivalent
to choosing the risk dominant Nash equilibrium
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and, on the other hand, small enough in order to ensure that the minimum
capacity on the market is sufficient to satisfy demand. The latter ensures
that case (iv) of Proposition 1 is realized which coincide with area E in figure
1. This is the only area in 1 where the retailers can earn positive profits.
Thus, the demand shock must satisfy
ε > r − 1 ≡ ε and ε ≤ min{kA, kB}+ r − 1 ≡ ε¯.
Taking this into account, the expected profit of retailer ℓ = C,D is given by
πℓ(rℓ, rt) =


0 if rℓ > rt,
1
2
∫ max{0,min{ε¯,1}}
max{0,ε} rℓ(1 + ε− rℓ)dε if rℓ = rt,
∫ max{0,min{ε¯,1}}
max{0,ε} rℓ(1 + ε− rℓ)dε if rℓ < rt,
(7)
with ℓ, t = C,D, and ℓ 6= t. The profit function (7) indicates that retailers
undercut each other until they reach zero profits. Therefore, the following
proposition holds:
Proposition 3 (retail prices) Depending on the capacity levels (kA, kB),
there are the following subgame perfect Nash equilibria in retail prices.
(i) If min{kA, kB} ≥ 1 there is a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies
with rC = rD = 0.
(ii) If min{kA, kB} < 1 all Nash equilibria in pure strategies are charac-
terised by rC ≤ 1−min{kA, kB} and rD ≤ 1−min{kA, kB}.
Proof: Suppose that rℓ > rt with ℓ, t = C,D and ℓ 6= t. This can only be an
equilibrium, if rt ≤ 1−min{kA, kB} and rℓ ≤ 1−min{kA, kB}, because oth-
erwise firm ℓ can increase its profits by undercutting and firm t by increasing
its price. Suppose, alternatively, that rℓ = rt, then either rℓ = rt = 0 must
hold, if min{kA, kB} ≥ 1, or rℓ = rt < 1−min{kA, kB}, if min{kA, kB} < 1,
because otherwise each retailer can double its profit by slightly undercutting
its rival.
The retailers cannot realize any positive profit because of Bertrand com-
petition, no matter whether the equilibrium is unique if capacities satisfy
min{kA, kB} > 1, or whether there are multiple equilibria as in the case of
min{kA, kB} < 1. In order to solve for the multiplicity problem in the latter
case, we need another assumption on equilibrium selection for these capacity
levels.
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Assumption 2 If min{kA, kB} < 1 holds, then the retailers choose the Nash
equilibrium with rC = rD = 1−min{kA, kB}.
Assumption 2 means that the retailers select the equilibrium where both of
them choose the highest price which generates zero profits.
4.3 Capacity Investments
Generator i = A,B decides on its level of generating capacity, anticipating
how this decision affects competition both on the retail and the wholesale
market. Note that the Bertrand competition on the retail market shifts any
possible rent to the generators of electricity. The wholesale price coincides
with p∗ = r∗ = max{0, 1−min{kA, kB}}, if the demand does not exceed the
aggregate capacity of both generators. Given a positive price, the market
demand is then characterized by x(r∗, ε) = 1 + ε − 1 + min{kA, kB} = ε +
min{kA, kB}. Therefore generator i’s profit function at this stage of the game
is given by
Πi(ki, kj) =


max{0, 1− kj}
∫ min{1,ki}
0
εdε− zki if ki > kj,
max{0,1−kj}
2
[∫ min{1,ki}
0
εdε+
∫ min{1,kj}
0
kidε
]
−zki if ki = kj,
max{0, 1− ki}
∫ min{1,kj}
0
kidε− zki if ki < kj,
(8)
with i, j = A,B and i 6= j. If min{kA, kB} ≥ 1 holds, then the wholesale
price is zero and none of the two generators can realize a positive profit.
If min{kA, kB} < 1 and x(r∗, ε) ≤ kA + kB holds and if firm i’s capacity
exceeds the one of its rival, firm i bids high and may serve the residual
demand max{x(r∗, ε)− kj, 0} = max{1 + ε− 1 + kj − kj, 0} = ε. If firm i’s
capacity is lower than the one of its rival, firm i bids low and may deliver its
total capacity up to the level of demand, meaning min{ki, 1+ε−1+ki} = ki.
If the capacities of the two firms are identical then firm i bids high and low
with probability one half each. Since the generators cannot sell electricity if
a black-out occurs, x(r∗, ε) ≤ kA + kB has to be satisfied which is equivalent
to ε+min{kA, kB} ≤ kA+kB or ε ≤ max{kA, kB}, if min{kA, kB} ≥ 1 holds,
which explains the upper integration limit in (8).
It turns out that generator i’s best response is to choose a higher capacity
as its competitor with
ki = 1 > kj,
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if its competitor’s capacity is relatively low or to choose a lower capacity with
ki = max{0,min{(kj − z)/(2kj), (1− z)/2}}
its rival’s capacity is relatively high.17 This is rather natural because, if
the rival has a small capacity, the residual demand served by the firm with
the large capacity is relatively large, as well as the price generated on the
wholesale market. Therefore it pays to install a large capacity. If the rival’s
capacity is relatively large it pays to install a small capacity which is then
completely sold and which ensures a higher price on the wholesale market.
From the analysis of the overall best responses the following proposition re-
sults for the first pattern of timing where the two firms choose their capacities
simultaneously.
Proposition 4 (simultaneous capacity choices) The level of capacity
costs determines whether a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strate-
gies exists with simultaneous capacity choices.
(i) If 0 ≤ z < 1/3, there are two asymmetric subgame perfect Nash equi-
libria in pure strategies, with capacities k∗i = 1 and k
∗
j = (1 − z)/2,
i, j = A,B and i 6= j.
(ii) If 1/3 ≤ z < 1/2, there is no subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure
strategies.
(iii) If 1/2 ≤ z, there is a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium where
generators install no capacity.
Proof: Firm i’s best response functions are derived in Appendix A. Solving
for the intersections of firm i’s and firm j’s best responses in capacities yields
the Proposition.
Figure 2 illustrates that, for intermediate levels of capacity costs, there is
no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies when capacities are chosen simulta-
neously. This non-existence problem disappears, however, if capacities are
chosen sequentially.
Proposition 5 (sequential capacity choices) With sequential capacity
choices, the game always has a unique equilibrium.
17See (20) or (21) in Appendix A for the detailed description of firm i’s best response
function.
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Figure 2: Best Responses in Capacities
(i) If 0 ≤ z < 1/3, there is a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies where firm A chooses k∗A = (1−z)/2 and firm B chooses
k∗B = 1.
(ii) If 1/3 ≤ z < 1/2, there is a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
in pure strategies where firm A chooses k∗A = 1−2z and firm B chooses
k∗B = 1.
(iii) If 1/2 ≤ z holds, there is a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies where generators install no capacity.
Proof: Substituting firm B’s best response function kB(kA) which is either
equivalent to (20) or (21) into ΠA(kA, kB) from (18) or (19) in Appendix A
and maximizing with respect to kA results in the Proposition.
Note that the first mover A always wants to be in the position of the small
provider with the smaller capacity than its rival B, because being the smaller
provider, which always bids low, but receives the high bid of the larger
provider in the wholesale market as the wholesale price and sells his to-
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tal capacity, is always more profitable than bidding high and serving only
the residual demand.
5 Integrated Duopoly
In this section, we briefly review the results for the integrated duopoly with
wholesale trade analyzed in Boom (2003), which contains further details on
this market configuration (including the proofs omitted here).
5.1 Wholesale Market
In this market configuration, generators may trade with each other (rather
than with retailers) on the wholesale market. When the unit price auc-
tion is held, total market demand is fixed and given by x(rd, ε) with rd =
min{rA, rB} being the price consumers must pay on the retail market. The
retail demand of firm i, in turn, is
di(rA, rB, ε) =


x(ri, ε) if ri < rj,
1
2
x(ri, ε) if ri = rj,
0 if ri > rj,
, with i, j ∈ {A,B}, i 6= j. (9)
If total capacity is sufficient to satisfy retail demand, i.e. kA + kB ≥ x(rd, ε),
the unit price auction yields the same wholesale price given in equation (5)
as with separated retailers, if we substitute rd for r∗. The volume of elec-
tricity that integrated generator i can sell coincides with (6), if, again, rd is
substituted for r∗. Thus, firm i’s revenues are
πi(ri, rj) = ridi(ri, rj, ε) + p(pi, pj) [yi(pi, pj, ε)− di(ri, rj, ε)] . (10)
Equation (10) states that an integrated generator earns the retail price for
each unit of electricity demanded by its subscribers plus the wholesale price
times the difference between the units dispatched to the grid and own retail
demand. This implies, in particular, that an integrated generator is forced
to become a net payer in the wholesale market if its retail demand exceeds
own capacity.
Our next proposition characterizes the resulting Nash equilibria in bid prices.
Proposition 6 (wholesale prices) Depending on the capacity levels (kA, kB)
and the retail demand x(min{rA, rB}, ε), there are the following Nash equi-
libria in price bids:
15
(i) If kA+ kB < x(min{rA, rB}, ε), any pair (pA, pB) forms a Nash equilib-
rium in price bids. No wholesale price can equate supply and demand,
and a black-out occurs.
(ii) If kA+ kB ≥ x(min{rA, rB}, ε) but one firm, say A, cannot satisfy own
retail demand, kA < dA(rA, rB, ε), then bids satisfy pB = p(rA, rB, ε)
which becomes the wholesale price p(rA, rB, ε) and pA ≤ p̂(rA, rB, ε) <
p(rA, rB, ε), where
p(rA, rB, ε) =
rAdA(rA, rB, ε)
dA(rA, rB, ε)− kj and (11)
p̂(rA, rB, ε) =
rAdA(rA, rB, ε)
min{kB, x(min{rA, rB}, ε)− dB(rA, rB, ε)} . (12)
(iii) If ki ≥ di(rA, rB, ε) for i = A,B, the Nash equilibrium pA = pB = 0 is
unique. The resulting equilibrium wholesale price is p∗ = 0, and firms
earn revenues of πi(rA, rB) = ridi(rA, rB, ε).
Proof: See Boom (2003), Appendix B.
Proposition 6(i) describes the case where aggregate capacity is insufficient
to serve retail demand, so that a black-out is inevitable. In case (iii), both
generators have sufficient capacity to serve their own retail demand, so that
they undercut each other until their bids equal zero and revenues accrue only
on the retail market. Finally, in case (ii), generator A must buy electricity on
the wholesale market to serve own retail demand. Therefore, it cannot avoid
becoming a net payer in the wholesale auction. Generator A can reduce its
net demand position, however, by undercutting its competitor, i.e., bidding
a price pA that is low enough that B does not have an incentive to deviate
from the maximum price p. Yet, even after undercutting, B appropriates all
rents and the revenues of A are zero.
5.2 Retail Market
Deriving the equilibrium retail prices is fairly tedious under integrated duopoly
(see Boom (2003)). We therefore confine ourselves to a brief discussion of the
pricing strategies available and then state the result without giving proofs.
In the retail market, each integrated generator has three strategies at its
disposal: First, it can undercut its rival and corner the market. This strategy
yields positive revenues only if the demand shock is such that retail demand
is positive and the undercutting generator’s capacity is sufficient to serve it.
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Second, it can match the price of its competitor, splitting total retail demand
in half. Then, expected revenues depend on the relative capacities of the two
firms: For the smaller firm, revenues are as in the undercutting case, except
that it attracts only half the demand. For the firm with the larger capacity,
however, revenues are different, as it can appropriate the rival’s rent if its
capacity is sufficiently large to make up for a lack of capacity of the smaller
firm. Finally, it can set a higher price than its competitor, in which case it
will not get any subscribers. However, it will earn positive revenues if the
competitor cannot serve total retail demand and own capacity is sufficient to
make up for the difference.
Proposition 7 (retail prices) Depending on the level of capacities (kA, kB),
there are the following Nash equilibria in retail prices.
(i) If kA = kB = k <
√
5/2, the pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium results
in retail prices
rd = rA = rB =


2−√2k if 0 ≤ k < 1/√2,
1
2
(3−√4k2 − 1) if 1√
2
≤ k < 1/√5/2. (13)
(ii) With not too asymmetric capacities, the unique Nash equilibrium results
in rd = rA = rB = 0.
(iii) With asymmetric capacities and kB < max{(kA − 1)/2, 18}, the pareto-
dominant Nash equilibrium results in rd = rA = max{34 , 2 − kA} <
rB. (An analogous equlibrium exists where the roles of A and B are
reversed.)
(iv) If 1
8
≤ kB < (kA − 1)/2, the pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium results
in rd = rA = rB = 1− 2kB. (An analogous equlibrium exists where the
roles of A and B are reversed.)
(v) If kA + kB < 1, the equilibria cannot be pareto ranked, but they are
payoff-equivalent as both firms realize zero revenues.
Proof: See Boom (2003), Appendix C.
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5.3 Capacity Investments
Again, we briefly discuss the strategies available to a generator and then state
the result without proofs (see Boom (2003) for details). If the competitor has
a very low capacity, a firm can either choose a very large capacity and corner
the market, or it can match the competitor’s capacity to generate positive
revenues (for a smaller own capacity, revenues are zero). If the competitor’s
capacity is larger (but still relatively small), cornering the market is no longer
an option; positive revenues are still possible, however, for a capacity much
larger than that of the competitor. For a still larger capacity of the com-
petitor, positive revenues from installing a higher capacity are impossible.
Finally, for a very large competitor’s capacity, own revenues are independent
of own capacity. For later reference, we summarize the possible outcomes in
our next proposition.
Proposition 8 (capacity investments) Depending on the level of capac-
ity costs, there are the following pareto-dominant Nash equilibria.
(i) If 0 ≤ z < 0.2118, there is a unique equilibrium where firms choose
capacity levels kA = kB = k̂, with
k̂ = argmaxk
{
1− 4k2 + 3√4k2 − 1
8
− zk
}
.
(ii) If 0.2118 ≤ z ≤ 1/(2√2), the equilibria that are not pareto-dominated
are characterized either by both firms choosing k̂ or by firm A choos-
ing the monopoly capacity km, defined in Proposition 1, and firm B
choosing kB = 0 or vice versa.
(iii) If 1/(2
√
2) < z < 1
2
, there are two equilibria with firm A choosing km
and firm B choosing kB = 0 or vice versa.
(iv) For z ≥ 1
2
, there is a unique equilibrium where firms choose the capacity
levels kA = kB = 0.
Proof: See Boom (2003), Appendix C.
Proposition 8 indicates that uniqueness cannot be achieved, even when con-
sidering only pareto-dominant subgame-perfect Nash equilibria.
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6 Comparing Market Configurations
In this section, we first construct rankings of the various market configura-
tions in terms of capacities, retail prices and welfare and discuss the intuition.
Second, we highlight the differences to the standard literature on vertically
related industries.
6.1 Rankings for Capacities, Retail Prices and Welfare
We first consider the capacity levels installed by the generators in the various
market configurations. We denote the aggregate competitive capacity level
in the case of integrated generators by kd = 2k̂, the aggregate capacity level
in the case of separated retailers by k∗ = k∗A+k
∗
B and the monopoly capacity
level by km.
Proposition 9 (ranking of capacities) Suppose that (i) capacity decisions
are either taken sequentially by the separated generators or that 0 ≤ z ≤ 1/3,
and (ii) that integrated generators co-ordinate on the pareto-dominant com-
petitive equilibrium. Then the ranking of aggregate capacity levels is
kd ≥ k∗ ≥ km. (14)
Proof: Follows from comparing Propositions 1, 5 and 8.
Proposition 9 states that generating capacity is the lowest in the integrated
monopoly and highest in the integrated duopoly. Vertically separated duopoly
generators provide an intermediate level of aggregate capacity.
To understand the intuition for this result, first consider the investment in-
centive of an integrated monopoly generator. Introducing another integrated
generator implies that there is both upstream and downstream competition.
If the former monopoly generator is now unable to serve its own retail de-
mand, he faces the risk of having to buy electricity from the competitor and
to give up all rents from selling electricity. The same is true for the com-
petitor of the former monopoly generator. To avoid such an outcome, each
generator will invest more than it would be willing to invest as a monop-
olist (kd > km). Second, consider the impact of vertical separation on the
investment incentive of a duopolistic generator. After vertical separation,
generators trade with retailers rather than themselves on the wholesale mar-
ket. Therefore, separated duopoly generators no longer face the risk of having
to give up all rents from selling electricity, and thus install smaller capacities
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than integrated duopoly generators (kd > k∗). In addition, Proposition 9
shows that the positive effect of introducing competition on capacity invest-
ments dominates the adverse effect of vertical separation, so that separated
duopoly generators install a higher aggregate capacity than the integrated
monopoly (k∗ > km).
Our next result gives a ranking of retail prices in these equilibria when the
two generators are integrated (rd), in the monopoly case (rm) and when the
two generators are separated from the two retailers (r∗).
Proposition 10 (ranking of retail prices) Suppose that (i) capacity de-
cisions are either taken sequentially by the separated generators or that 0 ≤
z ≤ 1/3, and (ii) that integrated generators co-ordinate on the pareto-dominant
competitive equilibrium. Then the ranking of retail prices is given by
rd ≥ rm ≥ r∗ (15)
Proof: Follows from comparing Propositions 1, 3 and 7
Proposition 10 indicates that the integrated duopoly yields not only the
highest aggregate capacity, buth also the highest retail price of all market
configurations under study. The separated duopoly, in turn, yields the lowest
retail price. The intuition for the high retail price under integrated duopoly
parallels that for the high installed aggregate capacity: Integrated duopoly
generators face the risk of being unable to serve their own demand, which
may be reduced by setting a high retail price (i.e., keeping demand low). This
incentive is absent under both integrated monopoly and separated duopoly.
Also note that retail prices are lowest in the separated duopoly, as retail
competition compresses the downstream mark-up.
Finally, we consider the welfare levels attained in the integrated competi-
tive duopoly (W d), in the separated duopoly (W ∗) and in the integrated
monopoly (Wm).
Proposition 11 (ranking of welfare levels) Suppose that (i) capacity de-
cisions are either taken sequentially by the separated generators or that 0 ≤
z ≤ 1/3, and (ii) that integrated generators co-ordinate on the pareto-dominant
competitive equilibrium. Then the ranking of welfare levels is given by
W ∗ ≥ Wm ≥ W d (16)
Proof: Since black-outs do not occur irrespective of market configuration,
social welfare is given by
W (k) =
∫ 1
0
U(x(r, ε), ε)dε− zk, (17)
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where k denotes total capacity. Substituting U(x(r, ε), ε) from (1), x(r, ε)
from (2) and plugging in equilibrium values for r and k for each market
configuration yields the associated welfare levels. Comparing these welfare
levels completes the proof.
Proposition 11 indicates that the separated duopoly yields the best results
in terms of welfare. Also, the integrated monopoly performs better than the
integrated duopoly. To grasp the intuition for this result, it is important to
note that irrespective of the market configuration, total installed capacity is
always large enough to satisfy retail demand at the relevant retail price,
so that black-outs never occur in our setting. This immediately implies
that increasing capacity, holding retail prices constant, increases capacity
costs rather than supply security. These increases in capacity costs must be
weighed against the effects of changes in retail prices for the construction of
the welfare ranking. Since both total capacity and retail prices are higher in
the integrated duopoly than in the successive duopoly, welfare must be lower
in the integrated duopoly. The welfare effect of changing from integrated
monopoly to separated duopoly is less obvious: Total capacity is higher,
but retail prices are lower in the separated duopoly. Proposition 11 shows
that the positive effect of lower retail prices dominates the negative effect
higher capacity costs, so that the separated duopoly performs better than
the integrated monopoly.
6.2 Discussion
It is useful to discuss our findings in light of the literature on vertically
related industries. A well-known finding of this literature is that vertical
separation, combined with imperfect competition, gives rise to a vertical ex-
ternality problem. That is, when making strategic pricing or investment
decisions, upstream firms do not take into account the effect of these de-
cisions on the profits of downstream firms (and vice versa). Due to this
vertical externality, firms (i) typically set inefficiently high (linear) prices,18
and (ii) tend to make inefficiently low investments.19 Vertical integration
eliminates this vertical externality and therefore increases welfare. The liter-
ature also suggests that more intense competition on either the upstream or
the downstream market helps compress mark-ups and increase investment,
18The classic reference is Spengler (1950). Tirole (1989) and Perry (1989) provide sur-
veys of outcomes in vertically related industries. See e.g. Abiru et al. (1998) for a more
recent contribution.
19See, e.g., Buehler et al. (2004).
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thereby raising welfare.20 Given these results, we should expect the inte-
grated duopoly to perform best in terms of welfare, as it combines vertical
integration with competition: Capacity investment should be highest, and
retail prices should be lowest. Yet, according to Propositions 9–11, this is
not the case: Capacity investments are highest under integrated duopoly, but
retail prices are also highest (rather than lowest), and welfare is even lower
than under integrated monopoly.
To understand why the standard predictions turn out to be inadequate in
our setting, it is important to note the following crucial differences to the
literature:
Reversed Timing. The timing of upstream and downstream decisions is
reversed. In our setting, it is the retail market that clears in the long run,
whereas it is the wholesale market in the standard literature. This implies,
in particular, that wholesale prices can react to changes in retail prices in
our setting, whereas retail prices cannot react to changes in wholesale prices.
Therefore, inflating the upstream price merely shifts rents from the down-
stream to the upstream market, without affecting the retail price. That is,
holding capacity levels constant, increasing the upstream price still has a neg-
ative externality on downstream profits, but leaves total welfare unaffected
Investment Effects. In our setting, higher capacity investments tend to
decrease (rather than increase) welfare. Recall that, in our setting, capac-
ity levels and retail prices are chosen such that black-outs do not occur.
Therefore, changes of market configuration that give rise to higher levels of
capacity do increase generation costs, but leave supply security unaffected.
That is, the only way increases in capacity can positively affect welfare is
over a higher demand that may be served without a black-out occurring.
This does, however, only occur if retail prices decrease as in the separated
duopoly scenario, but not if they increase as in the integrated duopoly.
Unit Price Auction. Upstream prices are determined in a unit price auc-
tion rather than a standard oligopoly model. Together with the reversed tim-
ing described above, the unit price auction implies that integrated duopoly
generators face the risk of foregoing all rents if they cannot serve their own re-
tail demand. To avoid giving up rents, integrated duopoly generators are will-
ing to make large capacity investments. This cannot happen in an oligopoly
model with standard timing, because they can always increase their retail
prices according to the capacity installed in the upstream production.
20For instance, in the extreme case of perfect competition in either the upstream or
downstream market, the vertical externality disappears.
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7 Concluding Remarks
This paper has established three main results on the effects of restructuring
electricity: First, capacity investments are highest under integrated duopoly
and lowest under integrated monopoly. Second, retail prices are lowest under
separated duopoly and highest under integrated duopoly. Third, the com-
bined investment and price effects of restructuring are such that the separated
duopoly yields the highest social welfare. Together, our findings suggest that
restructuring electricity is likely to increase both capacity investments and
welfare, if it implements (imperfect) competition and vertical separation.
Note that our findings are in contrast to what one might expect, having
standard results of the vertical integration literature in mind: There, intro-
ducing imperfect competition tends to undermine investment incentives and
increase retail prices due to the vertical externality associated with a double
mark-up. Our analysis shows that these standard predictions crucially rely
on assumptions on (i) the timing of the game, the (ii) the welfare effects of
investment, and (iii) the mechanism determining wholesale prices.
Future research should deal with a number of generalizations. First, it would
be interesting to allow for endogenous (and possibly asymmetric) vertical
integration along the lines suggested by Buehler and Schmutzler (2005a) and
(2005b). Doing so would enrich our understanding of the firms’ strategic in-
vestment decisions. Second, the discrimination of non-integrated competitors
has rarely been considered in the context of electricity. Third assuming an-
other distribution of demand shocks might create the potential for black-outs
in equilibrium. The latter might challenge our welfare ranking because the
higher retail prices and higher generating capacities with vertical integration
might become valuable from a social welfare point of view. Finally, it would
be useful to have a model with more than two upstream competitors, so that
the strong extra investment incentive generated by the risk of not being able
to serve own downstream demand would be mitigated.
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Appendix
A The Derivation of Firm i’s Best Response in
Capacity.
For kj ≥ 1 firm i’s profit function (8) translates into
Πi(ki, kj) =


−zki if ki ≥ 1,
(1− ki)ki − zki if 0 ≤ ki ≤ 1.
(18)
If 0 ≤ kj < 1 holds, firm i’s profit function becomes
Πi(ki, kj) =


1−kj
2
− zki if ki ≥ 1,
(1−kj)k2i
2
− zki if kj < ki ≤ 1,
1
2
[
(1−kj)k2i
2
+ (1− ki)kikj
]
− zki if ki = kj,
(1− ki)kikj − zki if 0 ≤ ki < kj.
(19)
The best response of firm i which is derived from maximizing (18) or (19),
respectively, with respect to ki yields
ki(kj) =


1−z
2
if kj ≥ 1,
kj−z
2kj
if 1−z−
√
1−2z−2z2
3
≤ kj ≤ 1,
1 if 0 ≤ kj ≤ 1−z−
√
1−2z−2z2
3
,
(20)
for 0 ≤ z ≤ 1/3. If 1/3 < z ≤ 1/2 holds, the maximization of (18) and (19)
with respect to ki results in
ki(kj) =


1−z
2
if kj ≥ 1,
kj−z
2kj
if z ≤ kj ≤ 1,
0 if 1− 2z ≤ kj ≤ z,
1 if 0 ≤ kj ≤ 1− 2z.
(21)
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